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ABSTRACT 
This paper systematically develops a set of general and supporting design 
principles and specifications for a “Dynamic Emergency Response Management 
Information System” (DERMIS) by identifying design premises resulting from the 
use of the “Emergency Management Information System and Reference Index” 
(EMISARI) and design concepts resulting from a comprehensive literature 
review.  Implicit in crises of varying scopes and proportions are communication 
and information needs that can be addressed by today’s information and 
communication technologies.  However, what is required is organizing the 
premises and concepts that can be mapped into a set of generic design principles 
in turn providing a framework for the sensible development of flexible and 
dynamic Emergency Response Information Systems.  
A framework is presented for the system design and development that 
addresses the communication and information needs of first responders as well 
as the decision making needs of command and control personnel.  The 
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framework also incorporates thinking about the value of insights and information  
from communities of geographically dispersed experts and suggests how that 
expertise can be brought to bear on crisis decision making.  Historic experience 
is used to suggest nine design premises.  These premises are complemented by a 
series of five design concepts based upon the review of pertinent and applicable 
research.  The result is a set of eight general design principles and three 
supporting design considerations that are recommended to be woven into the 
detailed specifications of a DERMIS.  The resulting DERMIS design model 
graphically indicates the heuristic taken by this paper and suggests that the 
result will be an emergency response system flexible, robust, and dynamic 
enough to support the communication and information needs of emergency and 
crisis personnel on all levels.  In addition it permits the development of dynamic 
emergency response information systems with tailored flexibility to support and 
be integrated across different sizes and types of organizations. 
This paper provides guidelines for system analysts and designers, system 
engineers, first responders, communities of experts, emergency command and 
control personnel, and MIS/IT researchers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There have been, since 9/11, 
considerable efforts to propose improvements 
in the ability to respond to emergencies.  
However, the vast majority of these efforts 
have concentrated on infrastructure 
improvements to aid in mitigation of the 
impacts of either a man-made or natural 
disaster.  In the area of communication and 
information systems to support the actual 
ongoing reaction to a disaster situation, the 
vast majority of the efforts have focused on the 
underlying technology to reliably support 
survivability of the underlying networks and 
physical facilities (Kunreuther and Lerner-
Lam 2002; Mork 2002).  The fact that there 
were major failures of the basic technology 
and loss of the command center for 48 hours in 
the 9/11 event has made this an understandable 
result.  The very workable commercial paging 
and digital mail systems supplied immediately 
afterwards by commercial firms (Michaels 
2001; Vatis 2002) to the emergency response 
workers demonstrated that the correction of 
underlying technology is largely a process of 
setting integration standards and deciding to 
spend the necessary funds to update antiquated 
systems.   
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CONTRIBUTION 
This is a normative paper in the specific application area of Emergency Response 
Management Information Systems.  It is written to reach three audiences: 
• Practitioners involved with the design of these systems. 
• Users and managers concerned with the development and use of these systems. 
• Researchers interested in doing further research in the area of emergency response 
information systems. 
It is a prime objective of this paper to trigger professional exchanges among the above 
communities that will lead to a new generation of these systems. 
The contributions of this paper are fivefold, it: 
1. Draws together a very diverse literature on requirements in this area and attempts to 
recover the important findings from some earlier literature and experiences in this field 
that are largely forgotten today. 
2. Develops a set of requirements for the design of Emergency Response Systems. 
3. Presents a conceptual design based upon those requirements 
4. Emphasizes the need for a single integrated enterprise type system that spans all the 
functions of emergency response from planning, through execution and recovery, to 
training. 
5. Points out research opportunities associated with: 
• Smart System Requirements 
• Collaborative Knowledge Bases 
• Virtual Command and Control Centers 
• Personalization of information filtering 
• Interface design challenges for use of PDA’s in this environment 
• Simulation and gaming requirements and training opportunities 
The real demonstration of the 9/11 
event is the strategic and technical fallacy of 
making the integration of communications 
between incompatible systems (fire, police, 
medical, etc.) dependent upon a single 
physical command and control center.  Such 
centers are vulnerable to a planned act of 
sabotage.  If there is any strong technical 
conclusion from the events of 9/11 it is the 
requirement to develop an integrated 
communications capability that can react as a 
distributed virtual system with no required 
need for the humans involved to be in a single 
location (Smith and Hayne 1991).  A virtual 
command center can be created when the 
authorities, decision and reporting 
responsibilities, the accountability tracking and 
the oversight monitoring functions are 
explicitly represented and present in the 
supporting communications software for the 
operation of such a human network.  In fact, 
those involved should be able to operate from 
wherever they happen to be at the start of the 
crisis: their home, office, or in transit.  It is this 
underlying technical goal assumption that is 
one of the foundation goals of the 
requirements discussed in this paper. 
Our primary concern in this paper is 
with the functionality requirements 
that the software needs for those 
planning and executing the emergency 
response management function.  
Very little has been published recently 
on specific functional requirements for the first 
responders to an emergency based situation.  
We also note that a great deal of the literature 
on emergency response prior to 9/11 focuses 
on the response of commercial firms to 
emergencies or crises largely restricted to the 
corporate environment (Barton and Hardigree 
1995; Braverman 2003; Kim 1998; 
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Lukaszewski 1987; Massey 2001; Mork 2002; 
Pearson, Misra, Clair, and Mitroff 1997; 
Smart, Thompson, and Vertinsky 1978; Smart 
and Vertinsky 1977 1984) or focused on the 
public relations aspects of a crisis (Coombs 
2000; Dyer 1995).  When an organizational 
emergency has macro-social effects and causes 
potential or actual physical harm to people or 
facilities, it usually leaves the jurisdiction of 
the single organization and can evolve to be 
the concern of local, state, and federal agencies 
depending on the scope and nature of the 
emergency (e.g. Bhopal, Three Mile Island, 
Tylenol, and Exxon Valdez).  However, there 
are a number of significant observations that 
apply to crisis situations regardless of the 
organizations involved. 
An important source for requirements 
will be the past operation and extensive 
experience of the Office of Emergency 
Preparedness (OEP) which existed over 25 
years until 1973 and was the only civil agency, 
prior to the new Department of Homeland 
Security, which could assume total control of a 
crisis or disaster situation via executive order 
of the president and execute the command and 
control function over all other federal agencies 
including the military.  The remainder of this 
paper first concentrates on the OEP experience 
and examines other literature dealing with the 
functionality to provide those managing a 
crisis.  It then further proceeds to develop a 
conceptual design approach to an integrated 
Dynamic Emergency Response Management 
Information System (DERMIS).  There is a 
great deal of tacit knowledge gained from 
experience in emergency response that should 
influence the design of the functional 
requirements for emergency response systems  
Table 1 (Dermis Design Model) shows 
the movement from Design Principles (Section 
3) and Conceptual Design (Section 4) to 
General Design Principles and Specifications 
(Section 5) and Supporting Design 
Considerations and Specifications (Section 6).  
An objective of this paper is to set forth some 
of this wisdom and its resulting relationship to 
design and to translate that wisdom into 
feasible requirements relative to modern 
technology. 
2. HISTORICAL INSIGHTS ABOUT 
EMISARI 
In the days of OEP, one of the principal 
resources was its large network of consultants 
who were experts and specialists from industry 
and academia.  They were individuals who 
could be called upon to help address issues and 
problems in both planning for emergencies and 
attempting to uncover vulnerabilities that were 
not being adequately dealt with.  They were 
people familiar with critical industries such as 
energy, communications, or commodities (gas, 
oil, chlorine, ferroalloys, etc.). 
Table 1  Dermis Design Model (Sections 3-6) 
A.  Design Premises 
1.  System Training and Simulation 
2.  Information Focus 
3.  Crisis Memory 
4.  Exceptions as Norms. 
5.  Scope and Nature of Crisis 
6.  Role Transferability 
7.  Information Validity and Timeliness 
8.  Free Exchange of Information 
9.  Coordination 
 
 
B.  Conceptual Design 
1.  Metaphors 
2.  Human Roles 
3.  Notifications 
4.  Context Visibility 
5.  Hypertext 
C.  General Design Principles and Specifications 
1.  System Directory 
2.  Information Source and Timeliness 
3.  Open Multi - Directional Communication 
4.  Content as Address 
5.  Up-to-date Information and Data 
6.  Link Relevant Information and Data 
7.  Authority, Responsibility, and Accountability 
8. Psychological and Social Needs 
 
 
 
D.  Supporting Design Considerations and 
Specifications 
1.  Resource Database and Community 
Collaboration 
2.  Collective Memory 
3.  Online Communities of Experts 
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In 1970 a computerized Delphi system 
(Turoff 1972) was prototyped and this 
confirmed the ability of a group of 25 people 
to engage in a collaborative Delphi process via 
a computer network.  The Delphi process 
(Linstone and Turoff 1975) was the design of 
paper and pencil based iterative structured 
surveys to allow large groups of dispersed 
experts (15 to 500) to exchange knowledge 
and viewpoints about complex problems.  
Today Delphi communication structures are 
also carried out over the Web (Cho and Turoff 
2003; Turoff and Hiltz 1995; Wang, Li, 
Turoff, and Hiltz 2003).  It was planned to 
install that system as a mechanism to better 
utilize the thousand or so professional 
volunteer consultants associated with OEP.  In 
1971 OEP was given the responsibility for a 
new emergency called a Wage Price Freeze.  
This event prohibited all changes in prices and 
wages including those that might have been 
part of existing contracts for the duration of 
the event.  It fell upon OEP to monitor 
nationwide compliance, examine, and 
determine requests for exemptions, and to 
investigate and prosecute violations.  The 
Delphi system was modified in one week to 
become an “Emergency Management 
Information System And Reference Index” 
(EMISARI) for the Wage Price Freeze.  The 
name was chosen to convey to the hundreds of 
people around the country involved a sense 
that the system and OEP was providing them 
what they needed.  
There had been no existing plans in 
OEP for a “wage price freeze” but since the 
resulting EMISARI system was designed as a 
communication system integrating people and 
data into a single data base where all the 
objects (people or data) could be dynamically 
changed by non-technical administrators, 
EMISARI became the only system that could 
keep up with the evolution of the procedures 
and processes governing the operation of the 
Wage Price Freeze.  Designed as a 
communication system (without explicit 
content), there was nothing in the design that 
related to the Wage Price Freeze or any other 
crisis.  As a result it was able to be used for 
any type of crisis.  The design focused on the 
group communication process (Hiltz and 
Turoff 1978, 1993; Lewin 1958; Ruben 1992; 
Turoff 1993) and how humans gather, 
contribute, and utilize data in a time urgent 
manner.   
EMISARI provided the dynamic ability 
to tailor the people, objects, and the various 
data, informational, discussion items, and 
action items into whatever template was 
deemed necessary and to modify that template 
at any time.  Such templates were assigned to 
the members (contacts) of the system by a 
system administrator who was a management 
person without any technical training.  About 
one third of the software was devoted to 
making it easy for an application professional 
to act as modern switchboard operator by 
creating templates and matching people to the 
functions defined by the templates.  The 
existence of full text descriptions for even a 
single data item allowed individuals to search 
for what they needed by content descriptions.  
Templates for data and other functions could 
be created and assigned in a few moments by 
the administrator.  Finally, the internal 
markups let the users themselves tailor 
dynamic reports on a given situation by 
reconfiguring the current information in the 
system.  This was done by easily specified 
Hypertext (Web like links) to any existing data 
or text template.  The reports with these links, 
when retrieved, would always capture and 
incorporate the latest updates of the defined 
templates (Hiltz and Turoff 1978, 1993).  
EMISARI was a highly structured group 
communication process that followed basic 
concepts of the Delphi Method (Linstone and 
Turoff, 1975).  It also provided an internal 
computer conference capability and its own 
internal message system that could be used in 
a delayed or instant message mode (Turoff 
1971, 1972). 
EMISARI went on (in the Internal 
Revenue Service, IRS, and the General 
Services Administration, GSA) after 1973 to 
be used over a fifteen-year period for 
transportation strikes, coal strikes, petroleum 
shortages, chlorine shortages, natural gas 
shortages and some of the more severe natural 
disasters (Macon and McKendree 1974, 1975; 
McKendree 1977, 1978).  The lore or tacit 
knowledge accumulation that takes place in 
organizations that go through a series of 
disasters is not often explicitly captured by the 
organization for reasons we will discuss later.  
However, natural disasters are valuable events 
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for developing organizational memories and as 
"occasions for organizational sense-making” 
(Weick 1993, 1995).  EMISARI incorporated 
many of the features called for today under the 
current rubric of knowledge systems (Bieber et 
al 2002). 
EMISARI allowed, with 1970 
technology, two to three hundred users 
scattered around the country to exercise a 
single coordinated group response to a crisis.  
Over the years there has been an accumulated 
literature on EMISARI (Hiltz and Turoff, 
1978, 1993; Kupperman and Wilcox 1972; 
Kupperman, Wilcox and Smith 1975; Price 
1975; Renner, et al. 1972; Rice, 1987, 1990; 
Turoff, 1971, 1972, 2002, Wilcox and 
Kupperman 1972). 
3. THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
ATMOSPHERE OF OEP 
The Office of Emergency Preparedness 
(OEP) in the Executive Office of the President 
grew out of the original OSS (Office of 
Special Services) operation during World War 
II.  OEP was a single civilian agency that 
could exert Command and Control over all 
federal resources (including military) upon the 
declaration of a Federal Emergency.  In such 
circumstances it could also exert regulation or 
actions from companies involved in the 
emergency situation.  This occurred regularly 
in such areas as transportation strikes, 
commodity shortages, natural and unnatural 
disasters.  OEP had a mission to assess threats, 
plan for the reaction to them, and to execute 
those plans when needed.  It also had 
responsibility to ensure that the government 
could function effectively in whatever 
emergency might occur.  In practice it was a 
single agency, at presidential level, where 
emergency response problems on the part of 
industry, federal government, state 
government, and local government could 
receive attention and action. 
In 1973 OEP was dissolved and the 
various functions of OEP were, in some cases, 
spread out to other government agencies 
and/or eliminated from civil government.  A 
number of years later FEMA (Federal 
Emergency Management Agency) was created 
as a centralized body, but it has been restricted 
largely to a reactive role with respect to federal 
disaster funds management and no significant 
mission ability for threat assessment, response 
planning on an integrated government wide 
basis, and most importantly, overall command 
and control in an emergency situation.  
However, the concept of central authority does 
not mean that those taking actions and making 
decisions consistent with their responsibilities 
have to be in one location or belong to one 
organization.  In emergencies, as in military 
operations, the central authority delegates 
decision making to those directly responding 
to the situation. 
One of the significant advantages the 
OEP had was that in an actual crisis they could 
draft any federal employee the agency felt it 
needed to be part of the crisis response group.  
This meant that for any situation the best 
possible team could, in principle, be created.  
Most often the process was one of quick 
negotiation for the talent it needed and only 
infrequently did OEP resort to ordering the 
transfer. 
There was a lot of lore and wisdom in 
the operation of OEP and there were still some 
senior civil servants and consultants from the 
WWII OSS (Office of Special Services) days 
who helped to set the tone and atmosphere of 
the operations of that agency (Hiltz and Turoff 
1978; Kupperman and Wilcox 1972). 
With respect to information systems, 
and in particular command and control 
versions of those systems, we might try to 
formulate the OEP philosophy in the following 
set of premises. 
Premise 1 - System Training and 
Simulation: An emergency system that 
is not used on a regular basis before an 
emergency will never be of use in an 
actual emergency. 
It is not just a matter of training but of 
finding actual day-to-day functions that 
emergency systems can perform so that there 
is no need for training in the use of the system 
when the crisis occurs.  Any sort of surprise 
situation that requires a group to be created to 
react to the circumstances would represent 
such training opportunities.  While many 
organizations do not like to admit to these 
events, they seem to be quite frequent.  The 
only training otherwise possible is a quick 
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apprenticeship by sitting at the side of 
someone who already knows how to react in a 
crisis and how to use the available facilities.  
We created in the late sixties a very simple 
multiple choice Computer Assisted 
Instructional (CAI) System which would 
provide a scenario on a given situation and 
present a set of alternative actions a person 
could take in a disaster response situation.  
There was always an “other” choice.  Both 
senior and junior staff at OEP could use it and 
if they felt there were circumstances not 
specified that would create a new alternative 
valid answer, they could choose “other” and 
explain the circumstances.  This very simple 
system allowed the responders to exchange the 
experiences and knowledge they had acquired.  
While in those days we considered it such a 
simple communication addition to a CAI 
system that we never published it, one can 
consider it to day a basic collective memory 
system.  One could, for example, do the same 
for sales personnel exchanging experiences.  
Even in the same type of natural disaster the 
specific circumstances in a similar situation 
could differ considerably.  Not everyone’s 
experience was exactly like that of others in 
even the same disaster. 
There are actually many events in 
commercial and governmental organizations 
that qualify as “mini emergencies” such as 
strikes, court cases, cost overruns, delivery 
delay, accidents, new regulations, supply 
shortage, natural disaster, budget shortfalls, 
production delay, product or service 
malfunction, contract negotiation, loss of key 
employee, loss of key customer, designing or 
responding to an request for proposal (RFP), 
competitive actions, etc.  All these sorts of 
events can be “serviced on a regular basis” by 
the concept of an emergency response system 
we will be considering.  In fact, it is a system 
ideal for use by large dispersed and 
asynchronous, i.e., virtual, project teams. 
After the prior Northeast Blackout the 
utilities in the Northeast created an emergency 
dedicated phone system to aid in coordinating 
activities to prevent another such occurrence.  
In the Blackout of 2003 there was more than 
an hour lag between the two major power-lines 
going out in Ohio and the final 90 second 
collapse in the New York area.  The 
emergency phone system was not used till 
after the final collapse throughout the 
Northeast.  One suspects it was a case of a 
system not regularly used between disasters! 
Furthermore, an existing user 
community is a critical aid during technology 
diffusion (Rogers 1995) in facilitating the 
introduction of new and unanticipated users 
that will always occur within the actual crisis.  
As a complex operation involving experts in 
the required areas, the concept of "easy to use" 
is replaced with "easy to learn" as the primary 
design objective.  Complex situations require a 
matching complexity of variability in a system 
designed to respond to such an environment. 
Premise 2 - Information Focus: People 
responding to an emergency are 
working 14-18 hour days and have no 
tolerance or time for things unrelated 
to dealing with the crisis. 
This has a significant impact on the 
design of support systems and rethinking the 
nature of filters, which attempt to prevent 
information overload, and searching processes 
for obtaining relevant information.  No one on 
the front line (physically or virtually) in a 
crisis has time to read a newspaper, listen to 
radio or TV, or take or return a phone call 
without it being clear why they must do so.  
When involved within an emergency situation 
they must be able to get the full context 
surrounding that situation as an integrated 
process within the system they are using.  It 
also means that one cannot exactly predict 
what they might be interested in ahead of time. 
This also means that the individuals 
carrying out the roles they are responsible for 
in the system need to have access to all that is 
taking place with respect to crisis and one 
cannot assume that the flow of information can 
be restricted which usually does occur in a 
crisis response situation operating under the 
“threat-rigidity” reaction hypothesis (Rice 
1990).  Under stress due to the lack of 
necessary information or coordination 
awareness people tend to rely on executing 
action formulas that might be totally 
inappropriate to the given situation.  What may 
be happening at a different location in the 
crisis might have an impact on a person’s 
decision about what actions to take.  
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Premise 3 - Crisis Memory: Learning 
and understanding what actually 
happened before, during, and after the 
crisis is extremely important for the 
improvement of the response process. 
Collecting information on the 
performance of people and systems in given 
situations should be incorporated into the 
design of the systems rather than as an 
afterthought.  The system needs to be designed 
so that it can be evolved and improved from 
the understanding provided by prior usage 
(Keen 1980; Zuboff 1988).  Also, capturing 
the history of what took place without 
imposing added load on the participants is a 
critical part of the design objectives.  This is 
related to the next observation.  
Premise 4 - Exceptions as Norms: 
Almost everything in a crisis is an 
exception to the norm. 
There is no way to predict exactly who 
is going to be doing what, when, why and/or 
how at the command and control level in a 
crisis environment.  The crisis forces increased 
decision making by those having to take 
immediate actions on site.  This authority is 
granted from those above who expect 
accountability in return so that they can carry 
out oversight with respect to conflicts for 
resources and other factors that need to be 
integrated.  Problem solutions and the 
reallocation of resources go on as a continuous 
unpredictable process.  When a paramedic 
remains at a site rather than returning with the 
ambulance it creates a limitation on the use of 
that ambulance as a fully staffed medical unit 
to be directed to other sites.  What specific 
data and information is of concern and interest 
to a given individual is changing rapidly.  
Exceptions to the planned response are 
the critical factors in determining the minute to 
minute operations.  Anything that no one 
thought of, but which occurs, in the response 
for a given crisis situation becomes the critical 
factor in generating problems to be dealt with 
at all levels in the process.  A crisis response 
system is an information system that has to be 
an integrated communication and data system 
where the people involved, their talents, 
concerns, immediate problems, actions taken, 
actions planned, situation information, and 
consequences information are all part of the 
underlying database and structure.  One cannot 
separate the data processes from the 
communication processes or from the human 
processes symbiotic to “data” and 
“communication” processes.  
This means the end user must be able to 
reconfigure the system interaction in a 
dynamic manner and designate changes in 
priorities, filtering and delivery options at any 
moment during the emergency response 
process.  It also means the system has to 
dynamically observe these changes and keep 
others who need to know about them up to 
date.  
Premise 5 - Scope and Nature of Crisis:  
The critical problem of the moment is 
the nature of the crisis, a primary 
factor requiring people, authority, and 
resources to be brought together at a 
specific period of time for a specific 
purpose. 
The crisis response team is a real and 
virtual community of specialists and experts 
that must have unrestricted access to one 
another and is able to act as a collective 
(Hardeman, Pauwels, Palma, and Van de 
Walle 1998; Weick 1993, 1995).  For specific 
problems, subgroups with the appropriate 
talent and backgrounds need to be able to form 
and function.  The system also has to allow for 
continuity and immediate substitution of 
individuals when members are lost to the 
process, forced to reposition their attention, or 
when they are just plain exhausted.  This also 
speaks to the necessity of training people to 
undertake multiple roles in a crisis situation 
and having enough people who can be brought 
in large scale or prolonged crisis situations 
(Danowski and Swift 1985). 
Premise 6 - Role Transferability:  It is 
impossible to predict who will 
undertake what specific role in a crisis 
situation.  The actions and privileges of 
the role need to be well defined in the 
software of the system and people must 
be trained for the possibility of 
assuming multiple or changing roles. 
Knowing who is available at the time of 
action has to be determined and taken as a key 
element of disaster response and the 
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requirements for command and control.  
Knowing what data relative to a problem is 
current, what the source is, and what is its 
degree of accuracy or status of the data is as 
important as the data itself.  Concepts such as 
roles, responsibilities and the explicit status 
variables of the data and roles (priority, 
accuracy, source, actions, interests, concerns, 
etc.) have to be part of the collaborative 
database supporting the operation.  
Premise 7 - Information Validity and 
Timeliness: Establishing and 
supporting confidence in a decision by 
supplying the best possible up-to-date 
information is critical to those whose 
actions may risk lives and resources. 
Emergency response systems must be 
able to refine the data and information and 
focus the sources of data on what is critical to 
a decision.  The system must allow for indirect 
and implicit communication channels between 
those dealing with interpretation and actions at 
different levels in the operation.  For example, 
the OEP system, during the Wage Price 
Freeze, would track the key words searched 
but not found in various files such as the 
policy interpretation file.  The list of words 
that those people in the field could not find 
would be presented to the weekly meeting of 
the policy committee examining requests for 
interpretations and was used to influence the 
agenda for the meeting.  This is an example of 
the system providing an indirect 
communication channel between those in the 
field and a policy setting committee.  The 
people in the field did not have to waste time 
making explicit communications.  Actions 
taken are always going to be based upon 
incomplete information and therefore every 
effort must be made to obtain and direct the 
information that is available into a common 
shared database structure that may be 
undergoing unpredictable change with respect 
to the nature and structure of what is being 
entered.  
The extraction of cues from streams of 
communications and data create indirect 
communications useful as input for any 
knowledge acquisition system (Hiltz and 
Turoff 1978; Wieck 1995).  In the emergency 
situation there is a need for important policy 
committees in the recovery phase and for 
prolonged crisis situations which may result in 
significant differences of view across multiple 
agencies or government bodies.  There can 
also be a need for very quick reaction 
committees at higher levels dealing with 
reacting to possible resource shortages or the 
integration of outside intelligence into the on 
going crisis reaction activities. 
Premise 8 - Free Exchange of 
Information:  Crises involve the 
necessity for many hundreds of 
individuals from different organizations 
to be able to freely exchange 
information, delegate authority, and 
conduct oversight, without the side 
effect of information overload. 
Consistency of response to all 
stakeholders is considered a primary 
requirement.  Problems in consistency of 
response result from the “Niche-Width 
Theory” (Massey 2001).  An organization is 
either a specialist or a generalist in the scope 
of the environment and this reflects more 
limited specific strategies or tactics for the 
specialist organization.  While a specialist 
agency usually has more correct knowledge 
about their area of expertise, the generalist 
agency usually has more influence on policy 
decisions.  This can be applied to the many 
organizations and agencies involved in a crisis.  
A good example would be the FBI as a 
generalist organization and the Centers for 
Disease Control as more of a specialist agency.  
The differences in response of these two 
agencies during the Anthrax emergency are an 
illustration of the coordination problem typical 
in a crisis situation.  Each agency was 
operating with different assumptions about the 
real mission and the lack of quick resolution 
by a clear authority led to mistakes, public 
inconsistencies in policies, and undermined the 
faith of the public in what the government was 
doing.  The Centers for Disease Control 
wanted the public to have all the details on 
what was happening for an objective of 
inhibiting further spread of the disease and the 
FBI did not want those carrying out the spread 
of the disease to have some of the information 
which might inhibit catching the culprits.  The 
problem about how to coordinate among the 
many agencies involved in a crisis has been 
expressed on numerous occasions in 
statements to congress dealing with the 
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formation of the new Homeland Security 
agency.  The challenge is expressed very well 
by Hale (1997, p. 5 of 15):  
…the key obstacle to effective crisis 
response is the communication needed 
to access relevant data or expertise and 
to piece together an accurate 
understandable picture of reality. 
Faced with extreme uncertainty, 
decision makers tend to increase their search 
for information – often for symbolic purposes 
and in self fulfilling ways – while 
simultaneously shutting down some channels 
of communication, and relying on familiar or 
formal information and channels (Rice 1987).  
Furthermore when information overload (Hiltz 
and Turoff 1985) sets in, groups tend to restrict 
their information processing and control 
moves up the chain of command, leaving little 
flexibility at the lower levels.  High levels of 
uncertainty and information overload are very 
harmful to reliable disaster response.  
Fortunately in most crisis situations we do not 
have to worry about ambiguity as a data 
corruption problem at the local and specific 
event level of response.  At the higher 
response level of oversight and resource 
allocation considerable uncertainty and some 
associated ambiguity can exist.  However, 
ambiguity results from the use of language and 
the communications system which can be 
minimized by the design of the system and the 
training in its use. 
As long as the responders are trained in 
their role responsibilities and there is a history 
of communication among a key nucleus of the 
situation reporters and the decision making 
responders there should be no significant 
ambiguity problem.  Furthermore, if the 
communication system is computer based we 
have a better ability to put in quick learning 
aids for those thrown into any situation with 
out adequate training.  If the system knows 
who they are it can provide additional 
feedback on what others will think what their 
words, requests, and actions mean.  The 
system can also enforce apprenticeship by 
assigning all communications for a “newbie” 
to be monitored by a real time coach. 
The deaths of many of the first 
responders on 9/11 can be largely attributed to 
this combination setting in as a result of lost 
communications.  With out awareness of what 
was happening, the lack of coordination due to 
the loss of the physical command and control 
center, and the overload from the immediate 
stimulus of what was occurring around them, 
many of the first responders were following 
the rules they had been taught with out 
reexamination.  As a result, we had a tragic 
example of the threat-rigidity hypothesis at 
work. 
Premise 9 – Coordination: The crux of 
the coordination problem for large 
crisis response groups is that the exact 
actions and responsibilities of the 
individuals cannot be pre-determined. 
As we will see this is a result of the 
uniqueness of each crisis situation, the 
resulting need for improvising based upon that 
uniqueness, the reliance on tacit information, 
and the time-critical nature of the decision 
process.  
Furthermore, governments have certain 
disadvantages over commercial firms when 
responding to a crisis.  They cannot easily hide 
what is going on and this in turn results in four 
factors unique to government agencies 
(Horseley and Barker 2002). 
1. Crisis raises questions about the 
ineffectiveness of government.  
2. Frequency of government (in-)action 
during crises certainly does not imply that 
government action is always functional or 
beneficial. 
3. Politics can turn crises from “occasions 
for decisions” into “occasions for 
restructuring of power relations.” 
4. Military and civilian organizations called 
upon in a crisis may show their Achilles’ 
heel during acutely critical situation, e.g., 
situations they did not expect or plan for. 
In theory, government agencies are less 
likely to get trapped in deceit, as corporations 
do precisely because they can more easily 
control and limit information. 
New ways to deal with the unforeseen 
events evolve with the nature of the crisis.  
The person needing to make a decision must 
be assured that anything relevant for the 
decision can be found in a timely manner; but 
also understand that precisely because it’s a 
crisis, what might be considered the most 
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“relevant” information may simply not exist.  
People can deal with a high degree of 
uncertainty, e.g., extract cues, to make timely 
decisions as long as they know it does not 
result from hidden information that will make 
their actions appear wrong later.  Providing 
access to all available relevant information at 
the lower levels is not always the attitude 
within government organizations. 
In a crisis situation authority flows 
down to where the action is.  However, status 
information and accountability data must 
equally flow both upward and sideways.  In 
fact, it is also important that teams have 
accountability as well (King 2002).  With the 
role carrying with it the authority for action 
and the collection of roles making up a 
momentary team for dealing with a particular 
set of related events, we have team 
accountability as well.  This implies a great 
deal about the functionality designed in an 
emergency response system.  It infers, for 
example, that the data and actions in such a 
system must clearly be identified by who is 
supplying an idea, a plan, a viewpoint, data 
and/or taking an action. 
The sixties and seventies saw 
considerable academic effort to understand the 
behavior of individuals and organizations in 
crisis situations.  An excellent report (Dynes 
and Quarantell 1977) compiled much of this 
research in to a single document.  In their 
summary they state the following (page 26): 
On the basis of what has been described 
here, the dominance of a normative 
planning model which emphasizes 
coordination by plan is, at best, 
questionable.  The crisis event itself 
creates the conditions where such 
coordination is inappropriate.  This 
inappropriateness, however, is not likely 
to be challenged in post-disaster critiques 
of organizational functioning which 
utilizes coordination by feedback.  The 
increase in communication is usually 
taken as a failure of coordination, not a 
necessary condition for it.  Emergency 
planning, however, can also be directed 
toward improving and facilitating 
coordination by feedback, since it is likely 
to be the dominant mode in emergency 
conditions, not a chaotic aberration. 
The extreme of coordination by plan is 
complete external control of those in the front 
lines, while the coordination of feedback 
assumes internal control by those in the front 
lines of a disaster situation.  The nature of the 
EMISARI system at OEP was the design of a 
system dedicated to coordination by feedback 
and it is this mode of operation that is also the 
essence of the proposed design that follows. 
Refusing to recognize the reality of the 
crisis situation, which is the movement of 
authority to lower levels and the need for rapid 
response, often results in the inadequate design 
of a system that can handle the oversight 
function in a timely and effective manner.  
Because many serious decisions are 
irreversible (Pauwels, Van de Walle, 
Hardeman and Soudan 2000) this leads to 
incorrect decisions that cannot be changed or 
delays in making a decision which eliminates 
the opportunity for the better alternatives to be 
chosen. 
Taking the above as the assumptions 
about the nature of a crisis it becomes clear 
that an Emergency Response Information 
System must be viewed as a structured group 
communication system where the protocols 
and communication structures are provided, 
but there is little content about a particular 
crisis except as an integrated electronic library 
of external databases and information sources.  
Others have agreed that Group 
Communication via a computer may be the 
most appropriate medium for a complex 
problem requiring input from large numbers of 
people (McKendree 1978; Price 1975). 
A more recent examination of crisis 
communications challenges highlights some of 
the same properties (Horseley and Barker 
2002):    
• Information overload is typical, 
• Heterogeneous groups and individuals 
must coordinate their activities, 
• People must work together who do not do 
so normally, 
• It cannot be accurately predicted who will 
be available and involved at the time of 
the crisis or at a given moment in the 
response sequence, and 
• Community and public communication is 
extremely important in dealing with many 
crises. 
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4.  RESULTING REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND 
CONCEPTUAL DESIGN SPECIFICS 
The nine premises and their underlying 
objectives and requirements discussed so far 
cut across all types of crisis and emergency 
situations.  We need systems that make no 
presumption as to whether one is dealing with 
fires, bombs, hazardous materials, 
transportation interruptions, etc.  It is the lack 
of dependency upon specified content that 
makes an emergency response system a 
powerful tool to apply to any emergency once 
the users have had the training and experience 
to master it.  There may be supporting data 
bases that contain content information such as 
the location and availability of specific 
resources for specific types of crisis situations 
or information and knowledge about such 
things as hazardous materials. These database 
resources could be anywhere, it is only 
necessary that the local responders know about 
them and how to be able to use them if needed.  
However, the system that carries out the 
response and allows the humans involved to 
coordinate and exercise various levels of 
command and control has to be a 
communication system tailored for the 
emergency response mission.  Fortunately 
there are communication commonalities to the 
coordination process in all disaster situations 
which we can utilize to design the necessary 
structuring.  
Our primary concern is with the design 
of an Emergency Response Management 
Information System that will directly support 
the responders in a local crisis situation and 
the associated coordination structure among all 
the involved parties and agencies.  We also 
assume the communications network and 
computing technology exist to support a 
reliable network of Personal computers, 
servers, laptops, and PDA’s, mobile phones, 
and wireless operations.  We are focusing on 
the supporting software and its required 
functionality.  The significant challenge that is 
being confronted is to provide a functionality 
that can be adapted for use on the limited 
screens of PDA’s as well as the larger screens 
of desktops and laptops.  While it is desirable 
and useful to consider multimodal interface 
capabilities, such as the addition of voice input 
and output (to free up hands for other tasks), it 
will not explicitly be treated except that the 
limited visualization capabilities of PDA’s 
does make the addition of voice input and 
output very critical as an alternative interaction 
mode for anyone needing to use their hands for 
their response activities (Pyush et al., 2002).  
The ability to record the details of a situation 
report may also require the ability to convey 
useful emotional content to express such 
things as seriousness, urgency, and conviction.  
The ability to incorporate sound bites and 
emotional icons into any text location and the 
need for graphics and color is also an obvious 
assumption.  The resulting foundation 
requirements are:  
• Extremely easy to learn via training and 
exercises because it is consistent with the 
task requirements. 
• Useable by people who will have an 
understanding of their roles and 
responsibilities in an emergency 
environment. 
• Will focus on a concise and self-evident 
design demanded by the small screen 
orientation and the need to minimize 
learning. 
• Will allow the individual users a high 
degree of tailoring, filtering, and focusing 
of the interface tailored to their specific 
roles and responsibilities.  
• Will serve to support planning, evaluation, 
training, exercises, and system updating 
and maintenance between crisis events. 
• Will allow the operation of the response 
function without the need for a single 
operational physical center except for the 
operation and backups for the computer 
hardware and software acting as a server 
and distributed resource databases for this 
operation. 
• Will be designed as a structured 
communication process independent of 
the nature of a particular crisis. 
To accomplish this we will focus on 
five very specific criteria for the interface 
design of a group communication system that 
is extremely appropriate to the emergency 
response environment: metaphors, roles, 
notifications, context visibility, and hypertext.  
1. The metaphor or metaphors of a system 
are the mental models of a system that a 
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user can easily learn in order to create a 
cognitive map that will make it easier to 
understand the system.  The metaphor 
allows the user to translate the task 
objectives into interface actions to carry 
out those objectives.  The type of 
metaphor that allows a human to create a 
“road map” or model of an information 
system is sometimes referred to as a 
boundary object (Star 1989). 
2. The concept of human roles built into the 
software of group communication systems 
(Turoff 1993) and supported by specific 
privileges and tools for carrying out the 
actions for those roles.  
3. The concept of notifications, which are 
relevant alerts to a user of changes in 
status, data, and/or information of concern 
to the given user, brought about by events 
and/or the actions of other users (Turoff 
1993). 
4. The concept of context visibility, which 
is the idea that the components of the 
meaningful data objects are presented in a 
context that relates to the understandings 
of the user.  By the user’s choice of a 
particular data element the system can 
infer the functions that that the user wants 
to perform at that point in time.  When the 
user is uncertain as to what will be called 
up or wants to vary the choice they need 
to be able to obtain all the possible 
selections as a submenu.  This produces a 
common sense object interface that makes 
choices self evident and tailored to the 
particular user. 
5. The original concept of Hypertext 
(Nelson 1965) which was the possibility 
of multiple two way linkages with 
semantic meanings that allowed a person 
to utilize any item in the content of the 
application as a set of menu alternatives to 
move to other content or functionalities in 
the interface. 
By tying these five concepts together 
we are able to hypothesize some very specific 
requirements for the design of a self evident 
Emergency Response Management 
Information System. 
4.1  Metaphors 
In a foundation paper on metaphors 
(Carroll and Thomas 1982) the concept was 
expressed that metaphors were not only useful 
for training users but that the “right” metaphor 
could establish the criteria for the actual design 
of the system, the interface, and its 
requirements.  There is no better illustration of 
this concept than the emergency response 
environment.  One concept or data construct is 
understood by all those who deal with crisis 
management and response: the “event log” of 
what took place during the crisis.  It is the 
primary concept usually used, after the crisis, 
to analyze what took place (Hale 1997).  Those 
who have participated in a crisis and tried to 
understand afterwards what actually occurred, 
typically use some sort of log of events.  The 
event log is the foundation metaphor for our 
design. 
Instead of a log being a postmortem of 
what occurs we can turn it into a dynamic 
evolving record of what is happening as the 
events of the emergency unfold.  Each 
individual responder would have access to the 
total log at various levels of summarization.  
At the highest level would be only the root or 
triggering events from the external 
environment that cause reactions to cope with 
the situation.  Clicking on any one of them 
opens the sub log of everything associated 
with the collection of information about the 
event and the resulting responses to the root 
event as well as the associated resources 
committed by recorded actions.  Clicking on 
any of the entities in the log will result in 
obtaining all the relevant links from that item 
to the various forms of associated information.  
The log is the on going roadmap of the 
emergency, which provides access to all the 
associated trails being blazed by the resulting 
actions.  The user can quickly travel in any 
direction that is of concern to them.  A 
responder would mark the events they need to 
track in order to carry out their role and 
responsibilities.  Any resulting actions of a 
marked event would be delivered to that user 
in the future. 
To accomplish this, the system needs to 
allow the users to establish templates for an 
integrated set of logs.  A single root log by a 
single individual can create over time, as a 
result of future conditions, a whole sequence 
of related event logs.  A typical example of 
root/parent log and its possible branch/children 
logs are: 
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Request resource root event log (location, 
situation) 
- Allocate (or deny, delay, partial allocation 
of) resource 
- Trigger a “maintenance of resource” as a 
new root event 
- Resource in transit to destination 
- Arrival of resource at desired location 
- Status change in condition of resource 
- Status change in condition of situation 
- Recycle of current incident event for more 
of the same 
- Resource reassigned before completion 
- Completion of original root event 
transaction for this resource 
- Resource in transit to normal location 
For example, the above sequence or log 
template might be used for a medical unit, 
which is typically composed of an ambulance, 
a driver, a paramedic, and various supplies 
along with a fuel supply.  However, any given 
unit might vary in the details (e.g., containing 
a doctor).  Furthermore, during the event the 
paramedic or the doctor might remain on the 
scene as the ambulance takes others back to 
the hospital.  A delayed response could occur 
because the only ambulance available needs to 
be refueled before it can start to satisfy the 
original request. 
During 9/11 there was no prior plan 
that called for using a ferry to act as an 
ambulance to deliver patients to the emergency 
outdoor medical area set up in Jersey City.  
Some event sets might have to be generic so 
that the concept of something like a medical 
unit can dynamically be redefined for a 
particular resource request event.  In this case 
a new type of medical unit would have to be 
established in the resource database during the 
crisis.  This nicely illustrates that particular 
resource types might need to be established in 
the database during the crisis.  It is the 
structure and process that comprise the 
software and not the content.  In this manner 
the system can be adapted to any type of crisis. 
The above template for a resource 
request when started for a specific instance 
would be time stamped and have the 
information on the reason, situation, and 
location that is the cause of the request entered 
(to the extent information is available, and the 
form should allow for multiple contributions to 
these, as different individuals in different 
locations will have different reasons, 
situations, etc.).  Such information might be 
updated as the request is in progress and all 
updates would identify the human source and 
the time of the update.  There might be a large 
set of resource requests sharing elements of the 
basic situation information and at any time 
details can be updated which in turn might 
have impacts on the resource requests and their 
adequacy.  In addition, there needs to be the 
ability for a new type of event template to be 
created during the crisis situation. 
Different people have as part of their 
“role” the authority for launching a given 
event type which may be a root or response 
event in a template.  This brings up the use of 
a secondary but no less important metaphor, 
that of the “checklist” (Hale 1997; 
Lukaszewski 1987).  Triggering an event 
brings up a checklist for the person to fill in 
the appropriate data and check off appropriate 
choices; but always assuming free form inputs 
for unexpected “other” unpredicted factors.  It 
would pinpoint the other roles that will be 
needed and whether they are occupied at that 
point in time, and display any other 
conditional impediments that might have to be 
considered such as the possibility of a delay 
and the reason for it.  If a medical unit cannot 
be immediately dispatched it might cause the 
people on the scene to take other or alternative 
actions (e.g., dispatching some injured in other 
vehicles). 
The person creating an event must be 
able to have the information that allows him or 
her to conclude that the related events will be 
able to proceed with reasonable dispatch.  In 
the original EMISARI system there was a code 
to indicate that needed data was not yet 
available which would substitute for the data 
in the output field.  Also with any such item 
the information was also provided as to who 
would be responsible for supplying and 
updating that data item. 
A typical mode of operation would be 
for everyone to receive those root events for 
the types, locations, and other conditions that 
they are interested in, i.e., marking them 
explicitly or having them linked to a marked 
event.  In addition only those events that the 
user marks for tracking would result in the 
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future delivery of other logs in the event 
template when they occurred.  In this manner 
the crisis responder sets up their own filtering 
mechanisms as events occur.  Clearly the 
person creating a root log event would 
automatically be delivered all follow on log 
items.  There needs to be an override where 
one person can determine if another has 
marked an event for tracking and if not trigger 
a resending of the event to the person who has 
not been tracking it.  This provides the 
opportunity for oversight and alerting 
individuals to items they may have 
overlooked.  The use of codes to designate 
missing information allows users to search, 
identify, and undertake efforts to obtain the 
missing data. 
The use of event log templates was 
added to a derivative of the EMISARI system 
(PREMIS) which was used to track the actions 
with regard to violations of federal orders with 
respect to numerous commodity shortages 
declared as federal emergencies in the 
seventies (McKendree 1978).  That system 
specified what actions the responsible party 
could take for a given event/step in the 
procedure and depending on the action notified 
the appropriate role (person) that it was time to 
take over responsibility for the given event.  
The proposed concept of a crisis decision unit 
(Smart and Vertinsky 1977) is a subset of the 
concept of event templates for crisis situations. 
Typical general event categories are:  
triggering events, resource requests, 
information requests, situation reports, 
completions, status changes, role changes, 
warnings/alerts, and leads/speculations.   
4.2  Roles 
Roles have always been a key part of 
any structured group communication process 
(Turoff 1993; Turoff, Hiltz, Bieber, 
Whitworth, and Fjermestad 2001).  Roles were 
a key concept in the original EMISARI crisis 
management system (Hiltz and Turoff 1978; 
Mckendree 1977, 1978).  Any piece of data in 
that system was always identified by who was 
responsible for supplying it and updating it.  
Who could launch what type of actions/events 
was also very clearly displayed and available 
for retrieval.  A person’s entry in the directory 
had a dynamic (time wise) list of any 
responsibilities and was searchable by 
responsibilities by every member of the 
systems. 
In a crisis it is never certain who will 
take on which role or which combination of 
roles.  It is expected that people will be trained 
to be qualified in a number of different roles.  
While one recognizes that a policeman is 
unlikely to take on the role of a fireman, when 
it comes to roles of reporting, making requests 
for resources and assigning resources we 
would expect that cross training is in fact 
feasible.  At the time of a crisis the first 
qualified person active in the system could 
immediately take on the highest priority role or 
roles they were pre-qualified for.  In some 
emergency situations individuals might be 
pressed into roles they are not completely 
qualified for if there is no one else available at 
the moment.  If this is a likely situation then 
we need to worry about ambiguity, real-time 
training, training aids, and more active 
oversight requirements for monitoring in the 
system design. 
The persons with the authority to assign 
roles could assign roles to any active member 
of the system based upon what was needed at 
that time.  Experience has shown that as a 
minimum, there are eleven fundamental roles 
that can take place in a large scale crisis 
situation.  Each role should be supported by 
functionality built into the software (Turoff, 
Hiltz, Bahgat, and Rana 1993).  The roles 
specific to the emergency response function 
are: 
Fundamental Roles 
1. Request resources:  people: medical, 
police, fire, military, construction, 
utilities, etc.; things: medical units, 
transport, fuel, equipment, etc. 
2. Allocate, delay, or deny resources 
3. Report and update situation 
4. Analyze situation 
5. Edit, organize, and summarize 
information 
6. Maintain resources (logistics) 
7. Acquire more or new resources 
8. Oversight review, consult, advise 
9. Alert all with a need to know 
10. Assign roles and responsibilities when 
needed 
11. Coordinate among different resource areas 
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12. Priority and strategy setting (e.g., 
command and control) 
In any crisis there are requests for 
resources; other people must decide if the 
request can immediately be satisfied or has to 
be denied or delayed.  There is also a need to 
report the situation at different locations, for 
different dimensions (medical, fire, police, 
etc.), and for others to analyze the incoming 
information to determine the implications for 
those: 
• Allocating resources, 
• Maintaining current resources, and 
• Acquiring additional resources to meet an 
expected demand. 
In addition we have, in many situations, 
the need to position resources, obtain 
specialized knowledge, e.g., hazardous 
materials, or to raise or lower the level of the 
current response to the crisis.  In the original 
EMISARI system one could dynamically 
establish report forms, including quantitative 
and qualitative inputs and assign them to 
people responsible for reporting the situation. 
Events and roles have an intimate 
relationship.  Event types should be open 
ended and the user community should be able 
to define specific event types and their 
relationships.  The following is a possible 
general classification of event types.  
• Triggering Events:  cause the need for 
action or response of some sort 
• Resource Requests:  requesting the 
assignment of any type of resource 
including people or equipment 
• Information Requests:  expressing the 
need for more information 
• Situation Reports:  descriptions of a 
current situation at any level of detail or 
scope 
• Completion Event:  the termination of or 
conclusion of a chain of events 
• Status Changes:  a significant change of 
status of a particular event chain 
• Warnings/Alerts:  something that needs to 
be watched for or investigated 
• Leads/Speculations:  an issue, concern, or 
possible happening that needs to be 
considered in the current situation 
• Role Changes:  a change in who is 
responsible for a specific role either 
temporary or permanent 
• Finished events:  event process completed 
• Interrupted events:  a pause in the process 
of treating the event 
• Suspended events:  a pause with no 
expectation of a startup 
• Archived events:  Event retired from any 
dynamic modification (frozen) 
The above categories apply to all 
events.  Orthogonal to the above event types is 
a classification for events specific to a given 
role which has a responsibility for a given 
event that has the following possible 
categories:  
• New/waiting:  events the user has not seen 
or dealt with yet 
• Event task tracking:  an event the role is 
now responsible for handling 
• Event monitoring:  events of interested 
being tracked 
• Action required:  a task for which an 
action must be taken by this role 
• Response required:  need for this role to 
supply information 
• Priority change:  a priority change in an 
item the role is handling 
• Status change:  a status change in an item 
the role is handling 
• Information request:  to this role 
• Finished events:  no need for further 
tracking, process completed for this role 
• Interrupted events:  a pause in the process 
of treating the event for this role 
• Suspended events:  a pause with no 
expectation of a startup for this role 
The above results in a two dimensional 
selection table for a user in a role which shows 
the number of events in each category and 
allows the user to obtain a list of the set of 
events by clicking on the count in that 
category.  The categories should be extensible 
by the user community.  
Usually, people deal with medical, fire 
fighting, law enforcement, military, utilities, 
and construction resources so that many of 
these fundamental roles are multiplied by the 
types of specific resources being considered.  
This means coordinators must take the 
responsibility to ensure responses from these 
multiple resources are not interfering with one 
another.  Typically today the response systems 
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for these different areas are separate and the 
details of what is going on with any one of 
them is not available to all that are involved.  
In World War II, the army and Navy decoded 
the Japanese transmissions on alternative days 
and prepared summaries for the leadership.  
Too late it was discovered that if the analysts 
had had access to the total file the likelihood of 
an attack on Pearl Harbor would have been 
much more obvious. 
In terms of our metaphor of the use of a 
dynamic log, privileges are associated with 
each role which in turn authorizes, for 
example: 
• Creating Event log entries of a given type. 
• Responding to specific types of event log 
entries. 
• Supplying information or data related to 
specific events. 
• Producing situational and interpretive 
reports related to sets of events. 
• Providing modification privileges over 
material entered by others. 
In general, one can define about 50 
primitive digital communication privileges 
including such things as allowing some one to 
set links in other people’s material or a person 
inserting material in files he or she cannot read 
(Turoff 1993). 
The role is an explicit object in the 
database that has specific links to all the other 
data objects in the system and those links carry 
privileges for actions on the data in the system 
(Turoff 1993).  Nevertheless, in the actual 
emergency it will be a human who takes on the 
role and carries out all the activities consistent 
with the privileges associated with the role.  
This was true in the first group communication 
system (Turoff 1972) for carrying out Delphi 
Exercises and in EMISARI.  Roles can be 
aided by computer agents and they can be 
recorded and canned for use in specific 
training scenario simulation games.  However, 
it is doubtful that one would ever want to 
assign any decision responsibility to any such 
agents in real emergency situations. 
4.3  Notifications 
The critical general property of 
computer-based communications that we are 
utilizing in designing a group communication 
system for crisis response is that only by using 
a computer can the content of the information 
being communicated also be the “address” for 
delivery (Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Turoff 1993, 
Turoff, et. al. 2001).  People in a crisis have to 
focus on information needed and the currency 
of the situation factors that relate to the 
decisions and actions they are taking.  Since 
what they need to know is very dependent 
upon the actions and knowledge of others, we 
need to notify the user of the impact of those 
particular items that relate to their roles, 
actions, responsibilities, and what they have 
decided to track in terms of current events in 
the system.  By having the users and their 
dynamic properties as an integral part of the 
data structure of the system, the computer can 
determine who should be sent what 
notifications.  Any other unstructured 
alternative like email would quickly lead to 
information overload (Hiltz and Turoff 1985).  
Given the unpredictable nature of a crisis and 
its reliance on tacit (unique) knowledge 
(Hayek 1945) being generated by the situation, 
one cannot develop or use algorithmic rules for 
the delivery of information.  The system must 
allow the users to self-organize the 
information by their actions.  Tacit knowledge 
can be acquired only through experience such 
as observation, imitation, and practice (Kim 
1998). 
As an example, the current number of 
ambulances that have been assigned and could 
be assigned is a dynamic variable resulting 
from events requesting the use of ambulances 
and the consumption of resources needed to 
maintain the ambulances.  At some point there 
is a need for a notification to one or more 
individuals that such a resource will run out at 
a certain time based upon both usage rate and 
the expectations of additional causalities due 
to further possible damage.  Someone has to 
seek an additional assignment of ambulances 
or vehicles that can serve this function to the 
resource pool and determine where they 
should be positioned.  Another example of 
tacit knowledge is the assignment of roles, for 
example, knowing who would be the best 
reporter for a given situation at a given time in 
the crisis.  In essence, when the information is 
not complete and not expected to be, the 
decisions will be utilizing the tacit knowledge 
or the intuition of the decision makers. 
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Depending on the nature and extent of 
the crisis, resources will start to run out and a 
very dynamic inventory function is needed just 
to alert the responders to projected 
consumptions of resources.  A human must 
determine when an action must be taken.  The 
local road conditions, extent of the crisis and 
numerous other factors make automatic 
assignment impossible.  Even if the supply of 
ambulances is running out, only a human can 
decide if the depletion rate and the demand 
rate in a given crisis situation will require re-
supply. 
Another critical type of notification is 
the “canned notification” (Turoff 1993) which 
also has roots in automated command and 
control systems in the military.  There are a 
number of distinct types, including response 
check-off and fill-in. 
The response checkoff type of 
notification is where someone indicates they 
want to respond to a particular item and 
obtains a list of alternatives from which they 
can choose a response that will become linked 
to the original item and be received by any one 
who received the original item.  Examples are: 
- I agree/disagree with it 
- I am taking care of this 
- Delay this action 
- Give this higher/lower priority 
Since the notifications are standardized 
and are linked to the item they are referencing 
receiver ambiguity should be minimized.  The 
creation and sending of the notification takes 
only a few clicks. 
The fill in type is where the receiver 
can fill in a specific item of quantitative or 
qualitative data with the notification 
- Need info on (subject)? (data, e.g. number 
of injured) 
- Will have more info by (time) 
- We will need (number) more (supply 
item) 
- What is your best estimate of the injured? 
(number) 
The specific wording of any type of 
notification is not important since the system 
should be designed so the local user population 
can define and change it at any time as an 
evolving process.  What is important is to 
capture those short messages that are likely to 
be repetitive in any crisis and allow people, as 
a result, to communicate with an absolute 
minimum of input operations by utilizing 
preformatted communication items. 
Notifications also serve as a retrieval 
handle in that any click on this notification 
will bring up the details about the item it is 
referring to.  This leads us to the concept of 
“context visibility” that is critical to the 
success of the system. 
4.4  Context Visibility 
A log event entry has associated with it 
the categories of information it is concerned 
with such as:  
• Log identification 
• Resource type(s) 
• Author and/or responsible party 
• Relevant location 
• Relevant circumstances 
• Next expected event or events and role 
responsibility for action 
• Status (associated events in the root log 
sequence) 
• Allowed or generated lateral logs (new 
root event logs) 
• Allowed or generated notifications 
• Footnotes or other linkages 
An event generating specific 
maintenance or re-supply of existing medical 
units or an event to acquire more medical units 
should be linked to any medical unit requests 
that have not yet been serviced. 
The elements that are attached to a log 
can act as the menu choices for the users to 
find out more information about the particular 
item in the log.  For example, clicking on an 
item in the log brings up various information 
about the item, as suggested in Table 2. 
Words and abbreviations in the specific 
context of an event log are used in much the 
same way as an icon is used to launch 
functions in an interface.  The advantage over 
icons is the much larger vocabulary of choice 
that the use of semantic memory (see 
Collective Memory section 6.2) allows us.  
This concept is an extension of context 
sensitive help function (i.e., Apple’s Balloon 
help) in interface design applied to the primary 
interaction as opposed to only the help 
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function – similar to Web mouse-overs, or 
pop-up comments on MTV videos! 
The design capitalizes on episodic 
memory (see Collective Memory section 6.2) 
to allow people to track cognitively what is 
taking place in time and the semantic memory 
to bring up the needed data or information to 
take required actions.  The role of the person 
determines what root events he or she will 
receive and there will be a function which 
allows the user to indicate if that particular log 
is one that they wish to follow or track with 
respect to the log items this event will trigger 
as children or peers.  This method of self 
filtering was first used in the TOPIC System 
(Turoff, Hiltz, Bahgat, Rana 1993) on 
Electronic Information Exchange System 
(EIES) in the late 70’s for hundreds of people 
to exchange information as a single group 
communication process structure.  In that 
system any one can send short requests for 
information but only if the user “marks” the 
question, as one marks an email message, do 
they get the replies. 
4.5  Hypertext 
The concept of Hypertext is far more 
general than the current operation of the Web 
which, unfortunately, most people assume, is 
Hypertext.  For the crisis management function 
one must go back to the originally conceived 
properties of Hypertext (Nelson 1965) which 
included:  
• All links are two way in that they have 
anchors at both ends so that if one goes to 
a location indicated by a link he or she can 
always trace that link back. 
• Links are typed semantically in that they 
have a specific meaning. 
• One can have many links issuing from an 
anchor point, each with its own semantic 
meaning. 
• The collection of the current links from an 
anchor point becomes a context sensitive 
dynamic menu providing context 
visibility. 
• Links are dynamic and can automatically 
change at any time as a result of collective 
events and actions by the users.. 
Table 2. Alternative Object Links (Hypertext Relationships) 
Context item Retrieved possibilities 
Log ID All event logs which are children of this one 
The parent or root event log 
Lateral generated “brother/sister” event logs 
Resource Type Current status of this particular unit 
Status of all unused units 
Status of all units at location 
Status of all in use units 
Status of all units 
Sources of new units 
Author or responsible party Current responsibilities and status 
Backup individuals 
Expected time for completion of action for this log or notification item 
Circumstances All associated status and qualitative information required for this event 
Location A map or diagram of location area and what is there as well as it is known 
about what is there. 
A text / table list of what is there 
Status List of completed events in this sequence 
List of incomplete events in this sequence 
All events in this sequence 
Linkages Notifications linked to this particular event 
Notifications linked to this sequence of events 
Updates and reports relevant to this event 
Expected events Who is to act on which events as a result of this one 
Footnotes Any footnotes of added explanations by anyone concerned with this event 
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None of the above is yet available as 
standard Web features.  Nelson (1965), in his 
early work on Hypertext, pointed out that links 
can have dimensional ordering.  A link from 
something like a medical unit within an event 
log entry can vary by the degree of generality 
or specificity.  The specificity extreme would 
produce the details of a specific medical unit. 
At the generality extreme it could be a report 
on the status of all the medical units involved 
in the crisis.  One of the many intermediate 
links could be the status of all the medical 
units in the given location this particular unit is 
headed towards. 
Whenever a user creates a link they can 
either indicate they want the most likely link 
they need or they can request a menu of the 
possible links from that anchor point.  The 
overall integration of metaphors, event logs 
and check lists, and semantic typing of links 
leads to the design of a self evident user 
interface (Balasubramanian and Turoff 1995) 
and allows lateral or divergent connections to 
be made mentally without information 
overload setting in (Hiltz and Turoff 1985). 
Coupling the two concepts of 
contextual visibility and hypertext creates a 
powerful integration factor for all the aspects 
of a crisis response system.  In essence, the 
choices provided to the users are dynamically 
adjusted to the status of the crisis and the 
events that have been logged.  A typical 
application that has some of these features are 
some electronic calendars where clicking on 
the entry or some subject of the entry retrieves 
further details about what is scheduled?  Today 
the effort to evolve the Web along these lines 
has appeared under the new term of the 
“Semantic Web” (Berners-Lee, Hendler, and 
Lassila, 2001). 
Supporting all the above should be a 
highly flexible and powerful list processing 
interaction capability, which can be tailored by 
each user, each role, and each screen type.  
The same functionality for list processing 
should be applied to all types of lists generated 
by the system.  It should allow the user to 
manipulate lists and to refine lists by 
establishing various filtering, organizing, and 
categorizing rules that can be applied for the 
benefit of the user.  The preferences indicated 
for a user would be a function of the role and 
of their problem solving style.  A general list 
processing foundation applicable to and 
consistent with any list on the system is the 
key to allowing users to reduce information 
overload.  Lists will be very dynamic as there 
can be changes occurring to a list by others 
while a person is utilizing it.   
5.  GENERALIZED DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
There are certain general design 
principles that should be applied to any 
emergency response system:  
Design Principle 1 - System Directory: 
The system directory should provide a 
hierarchical structure for all the data 
and information currently in the system 
and provide a complete text search to 
all or selected subsets of the material. 
A possible structure for the system we 
have been describing is: 
Directory 
- People 
- Background and Expertise 
- Group Memberships 
- Conference Memberships 
- Bulletin Board Editorships 
- Roles 
- Responsibilities 
- Log Event Creation Privileges 
- Current active log events 
- Completed log events 
- Notifications 
- Resource Concerns 
- Authorities 
- Roles 
- Events 
- Groups (e.g. medical, firefighters, 
volunteers, etc.) 
- Conferences (topic discussions) 
- Bulletin boards (Policies, Plans, etc.) 
- Databases (resources, information, local, 
national, etc.) 
- Learning materials and scenario game 
generators 
- Other Emergency Systems 
Clearly there needs to be a way to form 
specialized groups that are focused around 
certain areas of concern and to have supporting 
group conferences and message lists for these 
groups.  Bulletin Boards represent the semi-
static material that a small group of people is 
responsible for updating. 
The Design of a Dynamic Emergency Response Management Information System (DERMIS) 
The Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application (JITTA), 5:4, 2004. 21 
There is a lot of opportunity in this 
system for smart software to aid the members 
of the system: 
• Letting individuals know who is the 
subgroup concerned at some point in time 
with the same situation. 
• Finding information that a given 
individual is not aware of but should be. 
• Helping the user to adapt their linkage 
filters to meet a changing situation and 
requirements. 
The long term success of the system is 
clearly dependent on features like “smartness” 
being evolved as part of an on going 
development process with feedback from real 
users and real applications (Gervasio and Iba 
1997; Iba and Gervasio 1999; Van de Walle 
2003). 
Design Principle 2 - Information Source 
and Timeliness: In an emergency it is 
critical that every bit of quantitative or 
qualitative data brought into the system 
dealing with the ongoing emergency be 
identified by its human or database 
source, by its time of occurrence, and 
by its status.  Also, where appropriate, 
by its location and by links to whatever 
it is referring to that already exists 
within the system. 
This type of system cannot be an 
anonymous database: there are many situations 
where the source of the data is important, and 
that person will need to be contacted.  For 
example, there are resources that will be 
allocated many times during the course of the 
emergency and it can be necessary to request 
an update on the expected release of a resource 
before it is actually released for reassignment 
in order to determine if a similar resource that 
might take longer to accomplish the task is to 
be committed.  Status reports, that indicate 
why something is not going as expected 
(exception reports) and why expected data is 
not there yet, should also be included.  When 
information is incomplete knowing the data 
source allows others to make contact with the 
human source or reporter when there is a need 
to get more complete information.  The person 
who made the early report may not have had 
time to provide additional updates and might 
not be aware there is an urgent need for 
updates that might be available. 
A person preparing a report on some 
aspect of what is taking place should be able to 
link data or other comments into their report so 
that the report, when viewed, reproduces the 
material that is linked and shows the latest data 
entered which may have occurred after the 
initial report was prepared.  Also anyone in the 
system should be able to link footnotes to any 
item in order to make clear any relevant 
factors they have obtained about that item.  
This also serves to allow a discussion thread to 
develop around a particular data item.  As a 
result it quickly becomes clear who the 
persons are in the system concerned with a 
particular situation represented by the data 
item. 
Design Principle 3 - Open Multi - 
Directional Communication:  A system 
such as this must be viewed as an open 
and flat communication process among 
all those involved in reacting to the 
disaster. 
There is no way to predict what 
information is going to be needed and who is 
going to need it.  In fact, people often have to 
change roles in the course of the emergency 
and carry out processes they were not 
originally scheduled to be responsible for.  An 
emergency can continue for many days and 
some roles may have to be shifted to different 
individuals at different times due to the finite 
capacity of individuals and the concept of 
individual “diminishing returns.”  In addition 
the reduction of what is normally a 
hierarchical organization to a flat 
communication network and the resulting 
change in individual status has been observed 
in many crisis situations (Dynes and 
Quarantell 1977).  Associated with this is the 
increase in the number of decisions made at 
lower levels by those involved in the crisis. 
Design Principle 4 - Content as 
Address: the content of a piece of 
information is what determines the 
address 
This is, of course, one way in which a 
computer system adds a different dimension to 
data and information that is difficult to 
duplicate with other forms of communication 
(Hiltz and Turoff 1978; Turoff 1993).  
Individuals involved in the emergency, in 
addition to sending and receiving information 
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from other people, are inputting and retrieving 
information determined by its content.  A 
robust directory structure provides a 
comprehensive searchable space for people to 
find what they need and to create their own 
filters and links accordingly.  When people 
mark an event or data as being of interest or 
importance, it allows them to develop and 
organize just the material of interest to them.  
By adding the very simple feature of allowing 
crisis personnel to retrieve a list of all people 
who have marked a particular item as being 
important and then using that list as a 
communication address, subgroups of 
“common concern” can be formed in a very 
dynamic manner.  The formation and nature of 
such ad hoc groups is difficult to predict or 
plan.  It can be particularly valuable for those 
having analysis or reporting roles in the crisis. 
Design Principle 5 - Up-to-Date 
Information and Data: Data that 
reaches a user and/or his/her interface 
device must be updated whenever it is 
viewed on the screen or presented 
verbally to the user. 
This is a form of what might be termed 
"dynamic" linking in that all data exists as a 
master copy located somewhere in the system 
which also tracks where in the network of 
users it also resides.  When a user has data in a 
viewable state the master copy knows this is 
occurring and anytime there is a change, that 
change is transmitted to the place where it is 
being displayed.  This means the user can be 
assured that the status of resources he or she 
needs is always current.  For example, a 
certain number a user is viewing can change 
while it is being watched.  For events that have 
been marked by an individual for tracking, a 
change notification with respect to the original 
marked event status, information, or new sub-
event would be put on the user’s queue for 
viewing.  The user does not have time to 
search for an event of concern and a change of 
status in an event of concern should just be 
delivered and presented.  It might well 
necessitate levels of marking to allow the user 
to control the amount of delivered material by 
indicating what events should result in 
interruptions to the user rather than just being 
queued. 
Design Principle 6 - Link Relevant 
Information and Data: An item of data 
and its semantic links to other data are 
treated as one unit of information that 
is simultaneously created or updated. 
The concept of linking data is critical to 
the emergency response operation.  Any single 
item of data is associated with numerous 
attributes and other pieces of data.  The user 
cannot spend the time to contemplate and 
devise complex search queries.  Therefore a 
single item of data must have associated with 
it all the links that express its relationship to 
other data.  Furthermore, these links will have 
different meanings (link types) and will be 
two-way links (unlike the current Web).  
When a piece of data is created or updated all 
related links will also be brought into existence 
or updated.  If a person has moved through a 
series of links to arrive at some final data of 
interest it is insufficient to merely give them 
the “back” button to move back up in the same 
sequence.  There may have been a choice to 
branch that they now know they should have 
taken to examine other data as well.  Therefore 
the system should be able to provide the 
alternative links they could have taken and 
allow them to “go” directly to what they now 
want. 
Design Principle 7 - Authority, 
Responsibility, and Accountability: 
Authority in an emergency flows down 
to where the actions are taking place. 
This just reinforces the need for 
everything to be available to those on the 
scene of an event.  Those who are in a remote 
“command center” are there to ensure that the 
individual decisions being made in the front 
lines are not resulting in some negative 
cumulative result that has to be corrected.  The 
upper chain of command in an emergency 
operation is an oversight and exception 
operation with respect to localized actions.  
They need to be aware of when an action taken 
appears to be wrong because it is inconsistent 
or in conflict with other actions elsewhere.  
Authority for action has to exist with the front 
line roles, and higher levels should largely deal 
with monitoring, oversight, resource 
availability, and threat assessment.  Decisions 
become the launching of an event that is a 
request for an action to take place.  While 
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there are those empowered to halt an action 
because of a possible conflict or difficulty, the 
action will take place unless someone with 
oversight authority halts it while it is in 
progress.  There has to be clear accountability 
of who is taking what actions and it should 
also be clear to all involved when a conflict 
occurs and how it is being handled.  In disaster 
situations authority is always flowing 
downward (Dynes and Qarantell 1977). 
Design Principle 8 – Psychological and 
sociological factors:  Encourage and 
support the psychological and social 
needs of the crisis response team. 
It is necessary that social relationships 
be allowed to flourish and that the system can 
be utilized for the maintenance and 
development of those relationships.  This has 
positive impacts on reducing stress levels and 
facilitating the handover of roles and dealing 
with oversight.  The system must allow for a 
“team spirit” to develop.  People must get to 
know one another well enough so that they 
have no qualms about handing over their role 
to another person.  They must develop a 
feeling of trust in the others and have a good 
understanding of each other’s abilities.  
Knowing what can be asked of an individual in 
their fourteenth hour on a shift as compared to 
their first hour can be an important factor.  
Facilities like tracking the time on station for 
each user become significant. 
As more and more people are included 
who are external to the everyday 
organizational teams, the ability to accomplish 
social networking through “coffee break” 
conferences and chat rooms in order to 
develop quick trust is increasingly important.  
The encouragement of informal language in 
communications as opposed to only the use of 
rigid fill in forms with no open text 
commentaries allowed is also a design factor.  
No one would think of forbidding socializing 
in face to face groups but somehow it is still 
left out of the design considerations of the 
typical information systems environment.  
When an emergency system is employed as a 
dispersed virtual command center, this 
consideration becomes critical.  There is a 
strong need to be able to rely on one another 
and to accept frankness in viewpoints as the 
common norm.  This can only happen in a 
social network. 
The most challenging aspect of the 
interface design in this regard is the reduction 
of information overload and allowing the user 
to view the system as a helper that does not 
constrain the user to a single approach to 
problem solving.  The user should be able to 
adapt the system to his or her method of 
cognitive problem solving and not impose one 
rigid approach for all the users.  Rigidity in the 
interface is what will inhibit creativity or 
improvisation in unique problem situations.  
People in a crisis environment can operate 
under stress given the morale associated with 
the mission they are engaged in; however, 
when their tools do not match the performance 
levels they are seeking to obtain, this allows 
the “rigidity threat syndrome” to set in.  This 
area of interface design is still a basic 
challenge for the state of the art. 
6. SUPPORTING DESIGN 
CONSIDERATIONS 
There are a number of general 
requirements and supporting functionality and 
systems that are necessary for creating a 
comprehensive Emergency Response 
Management Information Systems 
6.1  Resource Databases and Community 
Collaboration 
A critical component of any emergency 
response system is a resource database.  This 
might be a collection of databases providing 
different types of physical, informational, or 
human resources.  Some national databases 
that exist in such areas as hazardous materials 
can provide timely information and clearly 
would be referenced in any local database.  
However, the key components of what needs 
to be in the local database span a very wide 
range of areas in order to be useful to any of 
the various types of disaster situations that 
might be encountered.  For example:  
• Any type of construction equipment that 
might be useful in a disaster situation and 
the people who can operate it. 
• Medical facilities and medical personnel 
including retired volunteers 
• Professionals with knowledge relevant to 
such things as hazardous materials, water 
treatment, building integrity, road repair, 
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explosive handling. 
• Boats and any sort of possible transporting 
vehicles and trucks. 
• Materials testing equipment, e.g. 
biological, chemical, etc. 
• Utilities: maintenance units and people. 
• Hazardous material information 
The design of a database to 
accommodate a very diverse set of possible 
resources is not difficult today.  However, if a 
local government agency has to pay to 
maintain and update the data to make sure it is 
current we then create a very expensive 
operation (Eichenbaum 2002).  The only way a 
resource database can be maintained by a 
typical local community or regional area is if 
the database is designed to be collaborative in 
nature. 
The people and organizations that have 
resources that could be borrowed, rented, 
commandeered (with compensation), or 
volunteered in an emergency situation need to 
be able to enter and maintain the data they are 
responsible for and should be able to use the 
database for their own purposes.  The database 
has to be set up as a community resource.  A 
contractor having an inventory of equipment 
that might be useful would maintain that entry 
via online access to the database.  It could also 
be that various organizations might like to be 
able to find certain resources in a non-
emergency situation and such a database can 
service the potential sharing, exchanging, or 
renting of resources in the community.  In 
September 11, 2001 there was a rush of 
contributions by industry (Michaels 2001) and 
this means it is possible to get community 
involvement if approached correctly.  In many 
local areas subject to reoccurring natural 
disasters this has always occurred. 
The maintenance of this database 
becomes a collaborative dispersed 
responsibility among the members of the 
community in a specific area.  Each person 
supplying possible resources would have direct 
access to updating their supplied data.  In 
addition, one would hope government 
organizations like state agencies, the National 
Guard, and military units in the area would be 
significant contributors to such a collaborative 
resource database.  Clearly, on a regional 
basis, local communities would be able to 
access each other’s community databases for 
resources that they might not have, or to deal 
with large scale disaster situations or extreme 
events.  A successful example of a 
collaborative dispersed database system is an 
inter-library loan system. 
A resource data base should be 
geographically-oriented and should integrate 
with all the data on utilities, buildings, and 
roads.  New York City was quite fortunate that 
it had such a data base in existence located in 
Brooklyn instead of the downtown office of 
the agency responsible for it.  It was invaluable 
in aiding the recovery actions and planning for 
the city’s recovery (Eichenbaum 2002; 
Thomas, Cutter, Hodgon, Gutekunst, and 
Jones 2002).  Such a database would also be 
invaluable as an aid in dealing with a 
spreading crisis such as a hazardous gas cloud. 
For organizations dealing with a crisis, 
the prior involvement of the public in the 
planning is considered a valuable asset once an 
actual crisis occurs (Dyer 1995).  This has 
been demonstrated in numerous natural 
disaster situations where public cooperation 
inhibits numerous possible complications and 
provides added manpower during the response 
phase.  Once people are involved in the 
planning they will also be willing to participate 
in exercises to evaluate the plan.  Given the 
lack of local and community resources in most 
smaller urban areas it becomes almost 
mandatory to try and incorporate community 
involvement in the crisis response planning 
and execution activity. 
6.2  Collective Memory  
Semantic memory or abstract memory 
provides rules about events, their interactions 
and dependencies, and how they relate to 
objects or data groupings.  Collective memory 
evolves from these generalities of cases 
making up the description of the real world.  
There is the process of dynamic association 
between the descriptive events taking place 
and the prescriptive responses to them.  The 
event log metaphor allows this to occur in a 
flexible but unambiguous manner that results 
in a cognitive approach to a collective memory 
(Warren 1996). 
Much work on collective memory and 
collective learning has been independent of 
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our understanding of cognitive psychology and 
sometimes too focused on organizational 
context.  However, it stands to reason that if 
we can associate the properties of a collective 
memory with those of cognition, the resulting 
systems may be much more intuitive to the 
individual members of the group.  This will 
allow more of the cognitive capacities of the 
individuals to be focused on the collective 
emergency response task.  Beginning with the 
merger of episodic (events) memory and 
semantic (typed linkages) memory and adding 
the ability of groups to form around content of 
“common concern” through their marking and 
action patterns, we have provided the 
possibility of forming a very dynamic 
collective memory.   
Event logs may be extremely helpful in 
tracking the course of a crisis and establishing 
an organizational memory (Hale 1997).  Hale 
further suggested they could be listed on flip 
charts in the control center!  This lack of 
comprehension as to what we can do with the 
technology seems to be rather common in local 
and regional emergency efforts.  Much of the 
current emergency efforts focus on telephone, 
radio, and face to face verbal communication 
technology.  In 9/11 the emergency 
responders, after the loss of the 
communications center and their verbal 
devices, were supplied with text based pagers 
and these are reported to have worked very 
well (Michaels 2001).  There is a considerable 
understanding today of the factors that 
influence adoption of new digital media (Rice 
2002) and sensible management policies based 
upon those understandings can easily bring 
about rapid diffusion of such technology. 
It is often difficult to codify and 
communicate knowledge that is only 
applicable to very specific situations and that 
is why scenarios are very appropriate for 
expressing tacit knowledge (Kim 1998).  Not 
everyone has had the same experience with 
respect to a crisis situation since the events are 
relatively rare (King 2002).  Even “natural” 
crisis events such as hurricanes, tornados, or 
earthquakes produce very unpredictable 
specific impacts when they occur (Barton and 
Hardigree 1995). 
Fine tuning, elimination of ambiguity, 
assimilating lore (tacit knowledge) from 
experienced members, discovering 
inconsistencies, building team cohesion, 
upgrading the realism and plausibility of the 
exercise are all important functions of the 
system and the associated training exercises 
(Nyblom, Reid, Coy and Walter 2003).  The 
formulation of a collective memory for dealing 
with critical situations of any type will 
ultimately be captured in the event templates, 
the types of notifications, role responsibilities, 
the content of the resource database and the 
training scenarios.  While some forms of tacit 
knowledge are probably impossible to make 
explicit (Hayek 1945), it is usually possible to 
capture the consequences, e.g. decisions, 
actions, of such knowledge (Belardo et al. 
1984, Belardo and Harrald 1992; Bieber et al. 
2002). 
People with experience are important 
sources of information.  Our biggest problem 
today is the way in which agencies within the 
same organization resist the release and 
sharing of information because prior mistakes 
might embarrass the organization.  What we 
need to foster is the continuous collaborative 
efforts of experienced people to be able to 
communicate and exchange information even 
when they are in different organizations.  
Some of the most critical knowledge comes 
from examining the mistakes that have been 
made. 
6.3  Online Communities of Experts 
Given the situation that the USA now 
faces and the fact that certain specialized 
expertise might not be available in all 
localities, the original idea of networking 
experts from 1970 at OEP should be 
revitalized.  This was the basis for emergency 
planning at OEP and the premise that lead to 
the initial work on EMISARI (Linstone and 
Turoff 1975; Turoff 1972, 2002).  This system 
integrated the large number of experts that 
OEP had on tap to aid in crisis planning by 
developing an online Delphi System.  Today 
with the Internet the idea of online 
communities is well established and the 
federal government should actually encourage 
such communities, which, in return for being 
provided the service, would commit to making 
their expertise available to local communities 
when a crisis occurs. 
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There are examples today of informal 
and formal communities of experts on the Web 
(Table 3).  Typically these are professionals 
involved in local emergency response planning 
and response efforts and they exchange some 
very insightful and practical papers resulting 
from their experiences.  This growing 
literature is a treasure for developing improved 
detailed requirements (Cameron, 2003).  
Another important example is the way our 
society handles the response to viruses on the 
WWW.  There are other groups in industry 
that use one another to seek critical supplies 
and resources needed to adjust to some peak in 
demand.  There are numerous collaborative 
markets in such areas as rare and used books 
where the professionals do in fact aid one 
another when it is of mutual interest.  
However, there is very little real design work 
in creating collaborative systems to facilitate 
such professional communities.  Too many 
people assume that primitive group 
communications such as linear discussion lists 
and email are all that is necessary and that is 
what is used in most of the above examples.  
The use of a tailored structured 
communication system as we have been 
describing in this paper would be appropriate 
as support systems for online communities in 
the emergency response area. 
Table 3. Professional Communities 
International Association of Emergency 
Managers 
http://www.iaem.com/index.shtml 
The international Emergency Management 
Society 
http://www.tiems.org/ 
Public Entity Risk Institute 
http://www.riskinstitute.org/ 
Public Safety Wireless Network 
http://www.pswn.gov/ 
Association of Public-Safety Communications 
Officials, International 
http://www.apco911.org/ 
National Emergency Number Association 
http://www.nena.org/ 
The American Civil Defense Association 
http://www.tacda.org/ 
Techsoup: The technology place for non-profits 
http://www.techsoup.org 
Humanitarian Relief Community 
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf 
 
The existence of communities of 
experts who utilize the same system as would 
be used in an emergency would minimize 
much of the training that might be required for 
the actual emergency.  Furthermore in most 
organizations, whether industry or 
government, there are always emergencies that 
surface as sensemaking occasions (Weick 
1995): shortages of resources, strikes, budget 
overruns, bad publicity, disgruntled customers, 
etc.  A well designed emergency response 
system can be used for normal 
communications in terms of basic 
communication needs and the more specific 
emergency response functions exercised in 
terms of the more typical short term 
organizational type crisis situations. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
In the emergency response area it is 
extremely fortunate that we do have a 
metaphor of the “event log” that most 
emergency response professionals are very 
familiar with and which has analogies to the 
actual way this would work in the computer.  
In addition this metaphor provides what is 
called "context visibility" where a great many 
functions that the system must carry out can be 
represented by direct links to the elements of 
the metaphor.  This will reduce greatly the 
effort for the user to learn the system and at 
the same time minimize the cognitive 
overhead for carrying out these operations. 
More importantly, the concept of events 
and roles translates to non-crisis activities such 
as meetings, plan development, committee 
functions, project functions, and training 
exercises.  It is very easy to conceive of using 
such a system between actual crises for all 
planning and coordination to be carried out by 
all the involved organizations and the liaisons 
from those organizations. 
The planning function is one that can 
be well served by heterogeneous teams 
utilizing this type of system.  This includes 
risk identification, risk assessment, crisis 
planning and preparation, mobilization, and 
recovery efforts (NyBlom, Reid, Coy, and 
Walter 2003).  All these can lead to 
improvements in the evolution of the system. 
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Using the system on a day to day basis 
for any sort of project activity, and even 
allowing participating organizations to set up 
internal copies for restricted use, ensures that 
people will remain trained and able to respond 
to a real crisis.  In any case there are always, in 
just about any organization, mini-crises which 
usually result in special teams or committees 
that have to work together to find a decent 
resolution to the situation.  Today it is likely 
they are dispersed geographically and could 
easily benefit from the type of system we have 
been describing. 
As a communication system it becomes 
easy to incorporate an event generator driven 
by clock time to turn the system into a 
simulation gaming system to exercise a plan 
for any type of crisis event consistent with the 
current resource database and available 
personnel (Van de Walle and Turoff 2001, 
Van de Walle 2003).  Those personnel from 
other agencies not available for the exercise 
can be simulated by the same sort of human 
role event simulation.  Being able to carry out 
the exercise in real clock time adds to the 
realism of the exercise (Turoff 1997) and the 
resulting training outcome.  A simulation is 
realistic if it induces the same psychological 
process in training that occurs in the crisis 
(Sniezek, Wilkins, Wadlington, and Baumann 
2002).  This is also a good reason why a 
training exercise should be a surprise to the 
participants and not scheduled ahead for a 
certain day and time as is often done.  Prior 
studies of role-event game simulations have 
shown them to be one of the best mechanisms 
of learning about a complex experience (Hsu 
1989).  To further heighten the psychological 
process one should have crisis response teams 
from different localities compete with one 
another using the same game scenarios.  This 
could also lead to establishing “community of 
practice” (Wenger and Snyder 2000) for 
responders on a national bases. 
These exercises should be used to allow 
evaluation and evolution of the system 
according to the feedback provided by the 
users.  If the users are used to making 
improvements to the system as part of the 
exercises, they are going to be more likely to 
avoid the rigidity of response resulting from 
the threat and its contributing stress factors 
(Rice 1990; Staw, Sandelands and Dutton 
1981).  What one would like is a crisis 
response system that stimulates creative 
responses by the team members to a specific 
unpredictable situation, e.g., strike, scandal, 
environmental problem, proxy fight, non 
performance on a contract, etc. 
What we have defined as a system is a 
Virtual Organization (Mowshowitz 1997, 
2002) made up of a formal and informal 
organizational workflow processes (Figure 1) 
and a meta process (Figure 2) to regulate 
structure. 
In terms of the Mowshowitz (1997) 
virtual organization structure, the uncontrolled 
events “crises/emergencies” are the 
requirements and the resources are the 
“satisficers.”  The roles are the switching unit 
that make the allocation of resources to 
requirements and serve as management in 
terms of collecting the information necessary 
to perform the switching so as to meet the 
objective of “mitigation of the crisis” and 
maintain adequate resources for allocation.  
Roles have both an informal mechanism to 
allow individuals to assume needed roles and a 
formal mechanism to assign roles that carry 
authority (that may be delegated) and 
oversight to ensure resources are used as well 
as they can be.  Taking the system that has 
been proposed here and allowing it to operate 
on all phases of the response process as a 
virtual organization will provide the system 
with the concept of “virtuality” (Turoff 1997) 
which means the system itself will influence 
change, and hopefully improvement, in the 
response process as an evolutionary process.  
In an excellent article by Bigley and 
Roberts (2001), a series of interviews and 
surveys of actual firefighting situations 
resulted in a number of significant 
observations on potential emergency response 
organizational structures.  A number of the 
conclusions and observations of that article are 
excellent, especially on the concept of roles, 
the need for collective understandings, and the 
need for delegation of authority.  The result of 
that paper is the proposal for an “Incident 
Command System” (ICS) which is a highly 
structured, top-down bureaucratic design with 
certain elements of flexibility that allow 
improvisation and authority delegation.  It is 
based upon verbal interaction and people who 
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are located largely at the site of the emergency.  
It presents an alternative in some ways to what 
has been presented in this paper.  In so doing it 
highlights the need for further exploration of 
emergency response structures. 
The view of this article is that the ICS 
approach would probably work well for a one-
dimensional emergency, e.g., a firefighting 
situation where everyone has a high degree of 
training and the response group is homogenous 
in nature.  It is not likely to accommodate a 
multidimensional crisis situation as the verbal 
mediation necessary for improvisation and 
flexibility will fall apart from information 
overload and the heterogeneous nature of all 
the individual agencies involved.  If we have 
learned anything about the design of computer 
based systems and especially communications, 
it is that automating the common practice from 
the physical world often does not perform in a 
manner to make optimal use of the technology. 
 
 
Figure 1: Workflow Communication Process 
  
  
Figure 2: Meta Communication Process 
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Perhaps the most worrisome concern is 
the “threat-rigidity” hypothesis developed by 
Staw, Sandelands, and Dutton (1981) and 
further discussed by Rice (1990).  Individuals 
undergoing stress, anxiety and psychological 
arousal tend to increase their reliance on 
internal hypothesis and focus on dominant 
cues to emit well-learned responses.  In simple 
terms, the potential response to a crisis 
situation is to go by the book and use only 
learned responses.  However, if the response 
situation does not fit the original training the 
resulting performance may be completely 
wrong.  One needs to ensure that people are 
encouraged to think about the situation and 
examine their potential actions to allow some 
degree of improvising or creativity.   
The communication and organizational 
structure and the flow of information are going 
to be very critical with respect to whether it 
encourages or inhibits rigidity.  It is our view 
that a flat organizational structure, one that 
allows equal participation with respect to 
access to whatever information they feel they 
may need to consider, will encourage 
flexibility of response.  In most organizational 
structures negative information gets more 
positive as it moves up the chain of command.  
Flatter organizations with respect to the 
movement of information tend to reduce this 
problem especially when the source of report 
is digital and available to all that are involved 
at any level.  This also has an impact on the 
attitude of the responders who should feel they 
are part of a cohesive group of peers all 
equally striving to do their best to mitigate the 
crisis.  The attitude of those responding to the 
crisis and the cohesive nature of the teams 
involved is critical to the success of the effort 
(Braverman 2003; King 2002).  At least one 
experimental study investigating the nature of 
organizational response to a crisis showed that 
friendships and trust that cuts across the 
organizational units allow teams of crisis 
responders to be more effective (Krackhardt 
and Stern 1988).  When we talk about a major 
crisis event we are talking about people across 
different organizations and agencies becoming 
a team.  This also speaks to the need for 
regular interaction between the responders and 
the formation and facilitation of an on going 
community. 
A recent survey (Horseley and Barker 
2002) of state government responses in various 
crises found that the most successful form of 
communications for dealing with events 
between various government units was 
interagency e-mail.  Communications between 
different agencies by people who have not 
worked together probably contains a lot of 
ambiguity.  The result of ambiguity is that 
people often think they communicated and 
agreed when in fact they did not.  When asked 
they would, of course, think the 
communication went well.  This is the 
common “ambiguity of consensus” that occurs 
in group meetings, where everyone is later 
surprised at what they are reported to have 
agreed to.  Clearly the use of group-oriented 
communication systems dealing with text 
would have been an even better technology for 
this task. 
It seems that every careful study of 
local emergency response even for non-
extreme events such as tornados shows that 
coordination is a major problem across 
different involved agencies and that many 
officials or professionals in these agencies do 
not remember or are not familiar with the 
emergency procedures (McEntire 2001; 
Parker, LeDuc and Lynn 2002).  The 
coordination problem is the key hidden 
problem in emergency response that has been 
largely ignored.  Physical reorganization of 
agencies has never been a solution to the 
coordination problem.  Providing the 
technology to allow people to form groups 
dynamically around a crisis is the approach 
that will address the coordination problem. 
With computers in the loop it is now 
possible to have a number of professionals at 
different levels observing and reviewing what 
is taking place so that oversight can work to a 
much greater degree than in the verbal 
environment with hierarchical levels of 
command.  Carrying with it the property of 
accountability also makes people much more 
likely to give a reasonable degree of 
consideration to any decision they make.  Too 
often in the verbal environment, who made the 
decision is sometimes ambiguous.  
Furthermore, in the standard database 
approach the identity of the contributor and the 
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rationale for the content are immediately lost.  
This lack of accountability in traditional 
information systems and the problems it 
produces for organizations has been 
recognized for a long time (Zmud 1979). 
The underlying model we have 
proposed for DERMIS would allow the 
introduction of a continuous audit process 
(Alles, Kogan, and Vasarhelyi 2003).  The 
function of this would be to track and 
determine if the available information, relevant 
to a particular problem, has been distributed to 
all those that need to be involved in the 
resolution of that problem at that point in time.  
Such an extension of the design would provide 
a high degree of assurance for the carrying out 
of the roles associated with the functions of 
delegation of authority, accountability, 
responsibility, and oversight.  It would also 
allow the efficient design of automated agents 
that could track and alert individuals to when 
they need to update themselves about a given 
problem situation. 
At this point in time too little attention 
is being paid to understanding and designing 
the command and control system for crisis 
events for local and regional areas.  Current 
advice on planning still focuses on having an 
emergency response center and back up center 
(NyBlom, Reid, Coy and Walter 2003).  The 
concept of being able to have a fully dispersed 
system is still non-existent and the cost of such 
physical centers can be prohibitive for many 
small communities.  
However the military and large 
corporations such as Bank of America and 
Wells Fargo are investigating virtual command 
and control systems as well as virtual 
emergency operations centers (Davis 2002; 
Roos 2002).  The virtual nature of 
communication has the potential to provide 
decision makers, at different levels, with a 
crisis situation visualization in a virtual reality 
space.  The virtual command center can also 
function from workstations at different 
geographical locations using Internet 
technology.  
In Chinese the word for crisis is made 
up of two symbols: danger and opportunity 
(Kim 1998).  There is an opportunity to 
improve dramatically the design and 
functionality of Emergency Response Systems 
and considerable danger to be faced if we do 
not! 
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